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Abstract 
The United States Supreme Court is unquestionably one of the 
most powerful institutions in the nation. Its decisions, to 
hear or not hear cases as well as its rulings, have the 
potential to determine how the various governments spend 
billions of dollars, which police practices are legal, and 
whether lives will be spared or ended. A significant 
decision of the Court in 1973 gave women the ability to 
legally obtain abortions. In 1977, the Court was asked to 
decide if the state and federal governments were required to 
pay for abortions for welfare recipients. The Opinion of 
the Court in 1977 has since become a controversial and 
significant pronouncement. 
What are the rhetorical elements in Supreme Court decision-
making? What is involved in formulating and writing an 
opinion, and in what ways may rhetorical critics evaluate 
such opinions? This thesis attempts to articulate 
rhetorical standards for analyzing Supreme Court opinions 
and offers as an example a rhetorical criticism of the 
abortion funding decision. 
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The Abortion Funding Decisions 
No current domestic social issue creates greater 
hostility than abortion. In this country, the right to 
terminate before childbirth creates social tension and moral 
cleavages perhaps paralleled only by the anti-slavery 
movement. 1 Not surprisingly, the rhetoric of the issue is 
both inflammatory and void of compromise. In 1973, the 
Supreme Court sparked the abundance of utterance when it 
made historic rulings which guaranteed that women could 
terminate freely within the first trimester of their 
pregnancies. 2 Four years later, the same tribunal renewed 
the controversy when it declared in three separate cases, 
Beal .Y..!. Doe, Maher .Y..!. Roe, and Poelker .Y..!. Doe, that public 
funds and public hospitals could be denied to women who 
1 Frank Susman, "Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton 
Revisited in 1976 and 1977--Reviewed?; Revived?; Revested?; 
Reversed? or Revoked?" Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Vol. 22, 1978, p. 581. 
2 Roe.!.!.. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, S.Ct. 705 
(1973). Hereafter referred to as Wade. All page citations 
are to United States Reports; and Doe v. Bolton 410 U.S. 
179, 35 L.Ed.2d 201, 93 S.Ct. 739 (1973}:" Hereafter 
referred to as Bolton. All page citations are to United 
States Reports. 
1 
choose to abort. 3 One of these decisions, Beal .Y..!.. Doe, is 
the focus of this study. The significance of Beal and the 
separate attention it merits emerge from examination and 
analysis of the maJor issues in the three decisions. 
Several commentators provide succinct statements which 
weave the cases together. One writes: 
In Beal, the Court stated that Title 
XIX of the Social Security Act does not 
require states that participate in the 
Medicaid program to fund nontherapeutic 
abortions. In Maher, a state's refusing 
to provide payment for elective abortions, 
while providing funds for childbirth, was 
found to be nonviolative of the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
amendment. In Poelker, the Court also 
addressed the equal protection issue, 
stating that a public hospital's policy of 
providing medical services for childbirth 
but not fir elective abortions was consti-
tutional. 
Other critics separate the cases on the same basis; Beal is 
a statutory decision, while Maher and Poelker are grounded 
in the Constitution. 5 Frank Susman claims that Beal is 
3 Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 53 L.Ed.2d 464, 97 S.Ct. 2366 
(1977). Hereafter referred to as Beal. All page c1 tat ions 
are to the Lawyers Edition; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 53 
L.Ed.2d 585, 97 S.Ct. 2376 (1977); and, Poelker v. Doe, 432 
U.S. 519, 53 L.Ed.2d 528, 97 S.Ct. 2391 (1977). - --
4 Angela Benzo Norman, "Beal v. Doe, Maher v. Roe, and Non-
therapeutic Abortions: The StatesDo Not Have toPay the 
Bill," Loyola University Law Journal (Chicago), Vol. 9, No. 
1, Fall 1977, pp. 288-289. 
5 See also, Constance Leistiko, "State Funding of 
Nontherapeutic Abortion Medicaid Plans Equal Protection 
Right to Choose an Abortion," Akron Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 
2, Fall 1977, p. 234; and, Kathleen D. Stingle, "Denial of 
Funds for Nontherapeutic Abortions," Connecticut Law 
Review, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1978 pp. 488-489. --
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"decided solely upon the grounds of the statutory 
construction •••• 116 The same assessment was reached by 
Trial magazine: "Beal.!..!.. Doe, then, arrived before the 
Supreme Court carrying only the statutory question." 7 
Michael Lalli points out that only after it reJected the 
statutory claim, was the Court "obligated to reach the 
constitutional issue. 118 . . . Historically, the Supreme 
Court has preferred to resolve welfare controversies on 
statutory rather than constitutional grounds. 9 In so doing, 
the Court first tests social policy disputes by the language 
of the law itself. If the Court overrules on that basis, it 
avoids the problem of overturning congressional intent on 
the grounds that the statute violates the Constitution. 
Hence, the Court could resolve a dispute over congressional 
actions without appearing to flex power over a theoretically 
co-equal branch. 
If the Supreme Court had wanted to overturn funding 
regulations, it could have done so on statutory grounds in 
Beal. As I shall show later, the Court could have Justified 
such a decision. In Beal the Court ruled that abortion was 
6 
7 
Susman, p. 584. 
"Supreme Court," Trial, August 1977, p. 14. 
8 Mich a e 1 A. La 11 i , "The Effect o f Rec e n-t Medic a i d 
Decisions on a Constitutional Right: Abortions only for 
Rich?," Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3, Spring 
1978, p. 698. 
9 ll.!!!!..!! .Y.!_ Rothstein, 398 U.S. 278 (1970). 
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the 
not medically necessary. Had it stated, instead, that the 
condition of pregnancy necessitates medical treatment, then 
the states would be required to fund whatever procedure the 
doctor and patient might choose. 10 Beal is the initial 
breaking point for all three decisions. Nancy Gall-Clayton 
points out this relationship: "Though Poelker follows 
rationally from Maher and Maher from Beal, by only the most 
attenuated reasoning can one explain Beal in light of its 
forebears." 11 Furthermore, it must be remembered that 
upholding Beal and ruling against the regulations 
restricting funding would have guaranteed Medicaid money for 
abortions. Even if the Court did not find a constitutional 
mandate to finance early terminations, it could have ruled 
that, under Title XIX, the states must pay for abortions if 
they enter the Medicaid program. This decision, apart from 
Maher, could have kept alive the flow of funds for Medicaid-
funded abortions. 
Since the written opinions of the maJority and minority 
articulate the alternatives to as well as the reasons for 
their choices, a close analysis of the Beal opinions should 
lO Eric C. Okerson, "Constitutional Law--Abortion--No 
Requirement to Provide Medicaid Funds for Nontherapeutic 
Abortions Under Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965 
or the Fourteenth Amendment," Tulane Law Review, Vol. 52, 
No. 1, December 1977, p. 184, pp. 186-187. 
11 Nancy Gall-Clayton, "Beal, Maher and Poelker: The End 
of an Era?" Journal of Family Law, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1978-
1979, p. 51. 
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reveal the bases upon which a significant Supreme Court 
decision has been made. It will also reveal the reasons it 
must be vigorously questioned. In order to Justify the 
preceding claim, this study will examine, first, the factors 
underlying Supreme Court opinion writing, second, the 
context of the abortion controversy, and third, the text of 
Beal and bases for questioning that decision. 
5 
Chapter II 
Supreme Court Opinion Writing 
Because of the complex interactions and secret 
deliberations inherent in Supreme Court proceedings, the 
essential tools in understanding that Court's behavior are 
its opinions. Although Supreme Court decisions have a 
tremendous impact on our lives, the processes that lead up 
to them, as well as the opinions which proclaim them, are 
poorly understood. Joseph Tussman believes that these 
processes of the Court are perhaps more important than the 
outcome of its decisions. He says that the Supreme Court is 
"important for what it does. But it is even more important 
for what it thinks and says as it does it."12 In this 
sense, the Court has an educational as well as Judicial 
function. Yet, it is this important aspect of the Court 
which is so difficult to discern. 
Herbert Jacob points to the primary obstacle to 
understanding Supreme Court decisions: the highly secretive 
nature of the Court makes it extremely difficult to discover 
its internal processes. Conferences are closed to 
12 Joseph Tussman, The Supreme Court£!!. Racial 
Discrimination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), 
p. ix. 
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outsiders, no records are kept of deliberations, and 
bargaining that occurs during the drafting of opinions is 
revealed only years after the actual decisions. 13 Because 
there are few other indices, Supreme Court behavior is often 
Judged by votes, yet "even those indicators are 
incomplete." 14 An excellent example of the risk of relying 
on votes to determine Court decisionmaking is found in Roe 
.Y.!. Wade. Traditionally, when the Chief Justice is in the 
maJority, he assigns the individual who writes the maJority 
opinion. In this case the Court struck down existing 
abortion statutes 7-2, with Rehnquist and White dissenting. 
However, Nina Totenberg, writing for the Washington Post, 
"reported that Burger originally dissented, but when he 
attempted to assign the opinion from the minority, Douglas 
became so upset that Burger changed his vote so he could 
assign the opinion according to the normal opinion 
assignment rules."15 
13 Herbert Jacob, Justice in America, Third Edition 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), p. 220. 
14 Jacob, p. 228. 
15 quoted in William R. Thomas, The Burger Court and 
Civil Liberties (Burswick, Ohio: King's Court 
Communcations, Inc., 1976), p. 148. 
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Importance of Opinions 
The Supreme Court deliberates in private; we cannot see 
how its decisions are arrived at. We can only look at what 
happens before and after a decision is announced. For this 
reason, Supreme Court opinions are extremely important to an 
understanding of that institution. Robert Leflar, a former 
Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court, contends that 
"opinions are the principal vehicle for Judicial 
communication." 16 But the importance of opinions is not 
only that they signal important pronouncements, but also 
that they are the products of Judicial review. Leflar says 
that opinions are the "public voice of appellate courts" as 
well as being "what courts do, not Just what they say. They 
are the substance of Judicial action •••• " 17 
Opinions are the core of Judicial review, and Supreme 
Court Justices, like all rhetoricians, are dependent upon 
symbolic processes. Harold Lasswell, professor of law and 
political science at Yale, says that legal progress and 
practice are bounded by innovations "in the study of signs 
and symbols." He recognizes the dependence of law on 
16 Robert A. Leflar, "Some Observations Concerning Judicial 
Opinions," Columbia Law Review, Vol. 61, No. 5, May 1961, p. 
812. 
17 Leflar, p. 819. 
8 
language, saying that "language is perhaps the most obvious 
feature of the legal process."1 8 Justice Charles Whittaker 
spoke of the problems encountered in comprehending legal 
ambiguities when he suggested that "we ought to be able to 
agree that words--though not ends in themselves--are our 
only tools and means of communicating thoughts and ideas." 19 
Opinions and Symbols 
Legal writing 1s similar to other rhetorical acts 
because its language reveals the deeper meanings implicit in 
all symbol use. When a court decision uses the terms "with 
all deliberate speed," something very meaningful is being 
expressed, and that expression is not synonymous with 
phrases such as "whenever it is feasible." Quite simply, a 
court's choice of labels is very important. To a large 
extent, labelling by the Supreme Court indicates how that 
body perceives the issues and the the role of the Court. 
Ellen A. Peters, an Associate Justice of the Connecticut 
Supreme Court says: "Depression is inherently more 
worrisome than sadness; due and deliberate speed is 
inherently more deliberate than due. Language as label is 
18 Harold D. Lasswell, "The Value Analysis of Legal 
Discourse," Western Reserve Law Review, March 1958, p. 188. 
19 Charles Whittaker, "A Confusion of Tongues," American 
Bar Association Journal, Vol. 51, 1965, pp. 27-28. 
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an important aspect of law as language."2 0 
Symbolic processes surround all aspects of Judicial 
review. Judges not only must choose their words carefully, 
but also they must look to unstated meanings and principles 
underlying the law which are discovered in the symbols of 
courts, constitutions, and public agencies. Specifically, 
Allan Axelrod, professor of law at Rutgers, points out that 
the Judge must follow the commands of the lawmaker. The 
adJudicator must achieve the purposes of another, but must 
"infer those purposes from the symbols in which they are 
expressed and predict what behavior on his part will create 
a world to his master's liking."21 The Judge is charged 
with interpreting the law and then applying it consistently. 
To attempt this, she or he will look at the symbolic acti-
vity of the legislature to determine the relevant unstated 
meanings and the principles underlying the law. This will 
inevitably require value Judgments, for while the public may 
believe that Judicial interpretation is suppressed in favor 
of applying strict legal principles, almost any decision can 
potentially be Justified by ignoring certain tenets and 
invoking a body of law which leads to the desired 
20 Ellen A. Peters, "Reality and the Language of the Law," 
Yale La_!! Journal, Vol. 90, 1981, p. 1195. 
21 Allan Axelrod, "Law and the Humanities: Notes from the 
Underground," Rutgers Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2, Winter 
1976, p. 231. 
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conclusion. 22 Jacob decided, after years of research, that 
what Judges "must do is make a decision on the basis of 
their personal preference or of what they personally 
consider to be in the public interest.1123 This is not to 
say that Judges ignore the wishes of lawmakers and rule on 
personal whims; rather, all decisions, even the "easy" 
ones, express a Judge's value preferences. A decision to 
rule in a manner consistent with all prior cases indicates a 
preference for adherence to previous legal reasoning on the 
point in question. Attorney Moses Lasky said: "The longer 
I am at the bar, the more it seems to me that every rule or 
principle of law ultimately rests on some short conception 
of good or bad, more assumed than demonstrable. 112 4 These 
conceptions of "public interest," "good," and "bad" exist in 
every decision a Judge makes, and they are revealed in the 
language of opinions. The role of the Judiciary is to 
interpret the symbols of the legislature, and within the 
confines of these mandates, the individual Judge exercises 
discretion and Judgment of values which is then revealed in 
his or her language. 
22 Moses Lasky, "Observing Appellate Opinions from Below 
the Bench," California Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 5, December 
1961, p. 834. -
23 Jacob, p. 101. 
24 Moses Lasky, "A Return to the Observatory Below the 
Bench," Southwestern Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 
1965, pp. 685-686. 
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In several respects, Judicial opinions are similar to 
other forms of rhetoric. The critic can easily Justify a 
commentary based on how effectively words and symbols are 
used, what deeper meanings are revealed in the language 
chosen, and how well the style suits and conveys the 
substantive message. There are, however, ways in which 
Supreme Court writings are dissimilar to other rhetorical 
acts. The most striking difference is the process by which 
opinions are written. 
The Writing Process 
Until John Marshall became Chief Justice, the Supreme 
Court followed the English custom of having each Justice 
give his views on the case. Marshall established the 
practice of announcing the opinion agreed to by a maJority 
of the Court. Only since 1939 have dissenting and 
concurring opinions been a usual occurrence. 25 The 
customary procedure today is to have the maJority opinion 
assigned by the Chief Justice when he is in the maJority and 
the senior Associate Justice when he is not. Lawrence Baum 
explains that the assignment of the writer is extremely 
important: 
25 R. Dean Moorhead, "Concurring and Dissenting Opinions," 
American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 38, October 1952, p. 
821. -
12 
First of all, the selection of the opinion 
writer may determine whether the initial 
maJority stands up and what its ultimate 
size will be, since different Justices may 
produce opinions with different effects on 
their colleagues. More directly, the policy 
proclaimed by the Court may depend in large 
part on who writes the opinion--if these-
lected writer can maintain the support of at 
least four colleagues for the the opinion. 
In addition, the assignment power allows the 
chief to reward and punish colleagues and 
thus provides an extra degree of leverage 
over them. 26 
The Justice who is assigned an opinion usually begins 
by writing a draft of the opinion which is then circulated 
among the other Justices "who may either agree with its 
contents, suggest changes as the price of their support, or 
disagree al together. " 27 The opinion becomes a focus of 
negotiation. As the opinion~is being written, there is an 
awareness that it must maintain the support of the original 
maJority of Justices. At the same time, the assigned writer 
may wish to garner the votes of as many additional Justices 
as possible. To this end, the writer "may be willing to 
change arguments or the ways in which they are expressed in 
order to satisfy other Justices and thus enlist their 
support." 28 The draft is circulated and revised because no 
opinion is certain until it is announced. Justices may 
26 Lawrence Baum, The Supreme Court (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981), p. 138. 
27 Harold J. Spaeth, 
Freeman and Company: 
28 Baum, p. 109. 
Supreme Court Policy Making (W. H. 
San Francisco, 1979), p. 27. 
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change votes up to the last minute. Often the opinion will 
reflect these bargains and compromises by omitting or adding 
phrases and pages.29 Baum says that the final version of an 
opinion "sometimes is fundamentally different from its first 
draft, even when the official author is the same."3 0 If a 
Justice disagrees with or wishes to add to a decision, he or 
she may do so by writing a dissenting or concurring opinion. 
The bargaining process, the additions and deletions of 
others, and the possibility of additional condemning or 
confounding opinions make Supreme Court opinions different 
from other communicative events. Critical assessments of 
Supreme Court opinions must recognize that opinions are 
often compromised for the sake of consensus and come out of 
a process which allows many individuals to influence the 
final drafts. 
Emphasis on Reason Giving 
A less striking, but still significant, feature of 
Court writings is the emphasis on reason giving. By 
requiring that a Judge provide reasons in an opinion, it is 
hoped that personal decision-making biases will be minimized 
in favor of a more obJective approach. David Shapiro, a 
professor of law at Harvard, talks about the task of 
29 
30 
Leflar, p. 818. 
Baum, p. 134. 
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explaining a decision: "At the very least, a Judge should 
be expected to present a defensible, coherent explanation in 
support of his [sic] conclusions •• n31 . . Tussman states it 
even more forcefully: "The court must give reasons for what 
it does. It must display its wisdom. 032 Of course, there 
is a difference between reasons~~ and good reasons. 
David O'Brien introduces some normative standards for legal 
reasoning when he says that "the Judge must Justify his or 
her decision in terms of impartial, consistent and neutral 
application of legal principles." This means that "the 
demands of Judicial craftsmanship require that Judges treat 
like cases alike ••• n33 . Law professor Christopher Stone 
concurs, saying that "the significance of the law's 'logical 
style' overwhelms almost everything else we do." 
Furthermore, "Justice requires that like cases be treated 
alike; analogies have to be sorted into those that fit and 
those that do not; metaphors have to be kept within the 
bounds of Judicious constraint."34 Shapiro also points out 
that it is very important that people are able to observe 
31 David L. Shapiro, "Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary 
View," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 2, December 1976, p. 
329. 
32 Tussman, p. ix. 
33 David M. O'Brien, "Of Judicial Myths, Motivations and 
Justifications: A Postscript on Social Science and the 
Law," Judicature, Vol. 64, December-January 1981, p. 287. 
34 Christopher D. Stone, "From a Language Perspective," 
Yale La}!_ Journal, Vol. 90, 1981, p. 1165. 
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how the conclusion is arrived at. If the result cannot be 
reconciled, there will be distrust of and disrespect for the 
Judiciary.35 In these ways, precedents can serve as 
important stabilizers. They can guide the Judge toward an 
understanding of how others viewed a similar situation and 
provide principles on which to Justify the verdict. 
However, precedents do not provide a logical formula which 
is beyond dispute. In law, as in rhetoric, logic can give 
the appearance of obJective application when the links to 
the given case do not support the connection which is 
claimed. 36 David Grey, a professor of communication at 
Stanford, reJects the idea of a strict, deductive, decision-
making process in law. Instead, he says, Judges normally 
follow an analytical pattern which relies on rationality and 
logic as they attempt to reason from case to case. "Here, 
the concept of precedent involves documenting the first 
case, making it the rule of law and then applying it to the 
second case."37 This chain of reasoning and evidence is 
extremely important to legal opinions. The process of 
writing stems from a belief that something more than a 
verdict is required; what is needed is the explication of 
how the conclusion was reached. Grey says that "Legal 
35 Shapiro, p. 329. 
36 David L. Grey, "The Supreme Court As A Communicator," 
Houston Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, January 1968, p. 414. 
37 Grey, p. 414. 
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writing ••• is committed to the philosophy of thoroughness 
in research and detailed building up and tearing down ••• 
of precedent."38 
Richard Weisberg, a professor of law at Columbia, 
contends that legal style refers to the inseparable blend of 
form and substance. He says that "style inevitably 
contributes to, and often controls, the present and future 
meaning of appellate opinions •• n39 . . According to this 
view, style involves the correct presentation of an opinion. 
He draws upon principles enunciated by Justice BenJamin 
Cardozo and says that style exists solely to serve the 
function of an opinion. Good style is ornamentation which 
contributes to the understandability and correct reasoning 
I 
of a decision. The critic should expect to see the 
progression of reasons and, further, be able to question the 
fittingness of logical demonstrations and the correctness of 
the use of precedents. Correct reasoning is essential to an 
opinion, and its absence can be the sole Justification for a 
critical Judgment that an opinion is bad. In addition to 
the features unique to Supreme Court opinions as a whole, 
there are several ways in which maJority and dissenting 
opinions are dissimilar not only to other communicative acts 
but also to each other. 
38 Grey, p. 419. 
39 Richard H. Weisberg, "Law, Literature and Cardozo's 
Judicial Poetics," Cardozo Law Review, Vol. 1, 1979, p. 309. 
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Functions of Opinions 
MaJority opinions have three primary functions. First, 
writing a decision forces a Judge to think through her or 
his reasoning process. Grey says that "the writing of an 
opinion seeks to ensure thoughtful review of the issues."40 
Leflar agrees, saying that this is a function which is 
"recognized both by detached students of the Judicial 
process and by opinion writers themselves. 1141 . Because 
appellate courts hear very important cases, it is desirable 
that they minimize the possibility of incorrectly applying 
the law by scribing their chains of reasoning. "Where a 
Judge need write no opinion, his [sic] Judgment may be 
faulty. Forced to reason his way step by step and set down 
these steps in black and white, he is compelled to put salt 
on the tail of his reasoning to keep it from fluttering 
away. 1142 By minimizing the potential for errors in 
reasoning, opinions enhance the image of judicial review and 
guard against arbitrary judgments. 
The opinion of the Court also has the important task of 




Grey, p. 416. 
Leflar, p. 810. 
Lasky, California, p. 838. 
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decision in the case at hand and setting out the reasoning 
and possible application to other cases. Alan Barth says 
that clarity is the most important stylistic feature of a 
majority opinion: 
When a Justice writes an opinion for the 
Court, his [sic] business is to state as 
clearly and compellingly as possible the 
grounds and the rationale of the Court's 
decision in order to give the Judges of 
inferior courts, and the bar in general, 
a definitive understanding of the law's 
reach and import. The more simply he can 
do this, the better for those who must inter-
pret the law for litigants and clients •••• 
MaJority opinions, therefore, tend to be 
bare-boned versions of a consensus, pro-
saically defining and expanding the law.43 
Stylistic flourishes may seem important to the opinion 
writer, but they can obstruct the function of the writing. 
The author(s) can sometimes work in aesthetic touches, "but 
beauty depends on taste, and some like it sour. Besides, 
the end is not beauty."44 The immediate goal is to explain 
to the parties involved the disposition of their case, while 
the long-term goal 1s to develop principles of law and 
public policy. Roscoe Pound concurs, saying that the 
opinion has "the wider function of furnishing a starting 
point for Judicial reasoning 1n analogous cases •••• " 45 
43 Alan Barth, Prophets With Honor (Alfred A. Knopf: New 
York, 1974), p. 4. 
44 David Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law (Little, Brown 
and Company: Boston, 1963), p. 441. 
45 Roscoe Pound, "Cacoethes Dissentiend1: The Heated 
Judicial Dissent," American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 
39, September 1953, p. 795. --
19 
Essentially, the opinion gives legalists an expectation 
regarding legal principles; it allows lawyers to predict 
further formulations of the law. 46 
A final purpose of maJority opinions is to enhance the 
legitimate powers of the Court and facilitate acceptance of 
its decisions. Jacob contends that, "Without published 
opinions, appellate courts could not make policy, for they 
would have no medium through which to inform the public 
about their actions."4 7 Professor Harold Spaeth views 
opinions as "the core of the Justices' policy-making 
power."4 8 The opinion provides a record of the Court's 
pronouncements. It is a proclamation to the legislature, 
the public, and the inferior courts of the reasoning and 
conclusions of the Court of last resort. 
The Various Audiences 
MaJority opinions are written for several audiences. 
Justice James Hopkins believes that the audiences for 
opinions vary, depending on the nature of the case. In 
issues of public policy, "the audience includes the 




Leflar, p. 811. 
Jacob, p. 232. 
Spaeth, p. 200. 
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community.1149 Of these groups, the community would seem to 
be the least important in the minds of the Justices. 
Professor Walker Gibson conducted a survey of twenty-five 
appellate judges. He asked, "To whom (or for whom) do you 
write your opinions?" The survey found that they write 
first for posterity, second for the bar, third for future 
Judges, and fourth for the legislature.50 The Supreme Court 
often expresses the position that it must act according to 
the law--regardless of public opinion. The Justices are 
thought to ignore their public relations in order to appear 
disinterested in the cases which come before them. Grey 
states that, "In contrast to Congressmen [sic] who may think 
in terms of news headlines, the Justices seem to ignore much 
of what will be written about their opinions.1151 Based on 
his interviews with Supreme Court Justices and others, Grey 
concludes that "most Judges do not expect to be read much by 
laymen [sic], and, therefore do not think in terms of a lay 
audience when writing."52 Instead, the primary audience for 
maJority opinions "is the group of Justices who might go 
along with ••• " the writer's decision.53 
49 James D. Hopkins, "Notes on Style in Judicial Opinions," 
Trial Judges' Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3, July 1969, p. 49. 
50 quoted in Leflar, p. 813. 
51 Grey, p. 411. 
52 Grey, p. 419. 
53 Grey, p. 41 7. 
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While it may be true that Justices are primarily 
concerned with obtaining a maJority, it is difficult to 
believe that they are unconcerned with public acceptance of 
their decisions. United States Circuit Court of Appeals 
Judge Harry T. Edwards says that "most Judges do not decide 
cases in pursuit of public acclaim; nevertheless, knowing 
full well that Judicial decisions are released for public 
ingestion, judges surely do seek to produce thoughtful, 
rational, and fully Justified opinions.1154 Baum speaks 
specifically of the Supreme Court when he says that 
"Justices know that the impact of their decisions depends on 
acceptance of individual decisions and of the Court's 
authority as an institution by the mass public.1155 He 
believes that the substance of the decision in Brown .Y.!.. 
Board of Education was affected by the concern for public 
acceptance: 
The Court chose to establish an indefi-
nite timetable for school desegregation 
in the South rather than demanding quick 
action. This choice was based in part 
on a calculation that flexibility by the 
Court would help to obtain southern accept-
ance of the general principle of desegregation. 56 
While it is clear from Edwards and Baum that the Court 
54 Harry T. Edwards, "A Judge's View on Justice, 
Bureaucracy, and Legal Method," Michigan Law Review, Vol. 
80, December 1981, p. 268. 
55 
56 
Baum, p. 119. 
Baum, p. 119. 
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considers public opinion, it is unclear how much this 
affects the writing of an opinion. Although, the Supreme 
Court is concerned with the results of its decisions, the 
public is not necessarily going to react to the particular 
language of a decision as much as it will respond to the 
operationalization of the opinion. Specific wording may be 
influenced less by public reaction to a decision and more by 
a concern for how legalists will interpret the rhetoric. 
Opinions have several audiences, depending upon the 
stage of the writing. Before a decision is announced, a 
Justice's primary obJective is to get a maJority so that he 
or she has a decision. After that point, it becomes 
important to convey the message to the bar, the legislature, 
and, finally, the community. And while Justices may claim 
to ignore public opinion, it should be remembered that their 
legal role requires that they take a public position of 
impartiality and disinterest in popular reactions. 
These criteria define various ways of examining Supreme 
Court writings. For many people, legal terminology and 
conventions create barriers to understanding court 
proceedings. While it is a given that the Supreme Court 
must speak in legalistic terms, it is also true that this 
institution can only be effective when its positions are 
understood by the people who are, and will be, affected by 
its decisions. Given the purposes of a maJority opinion, a 
critic is on solid ground when questioning the reasoning, 
clarity, precision, and reasonableness of a decision. We 
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can expect an opinion to specify the criteria and reasoning 
for its conclusions. We can demand precise use of language 
and precedent cases. We can require accurate use of 
information and responses to the competing claims of the 
advocates. Also, a critic can analyze a Justice's ability 
to write for the various audiences of the Supreme Court in 
order to determine how well the rhetoric is adapted to its 
receivers. 
Minority Opinions 
If a Justice does not agree with the maJority opinion, 
she or he may write a separate concurring or dissenting 
opinion, depending on how that Justice votes. 
Strategically, the dissenter usually waits for the opinion 
of the Court to be completed before writing the dissent. 
This allows for a more effective rebuttal because the 
Justice has already seen the case for the other side. 57 
While dissents may stem from strong feelings and emotions, 
the Court has a tradition that condemnations of the maJority 
be stated in terms that show respect. 58 There are no 
inviolate rules, only conventions which most Justices 
attempt to uphold. At the same time, minority opinions are 
57 
58 
Spaeth, pp. 28-29. 
Barth, p. 6. 
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less constrained. The opinion of the Court must be clear 
and restrained; by contrast the dissent can embody passages 
"of great force, eloquence, and ardor."5 9 Dissents allow 
Judges to look beyond the case at hand and address the 
larger implications of a decision. These opinions are 
products of individuals and are written for a variety of 
reasons. They appeal to various audiences, depending upon 
the purposes of the Justice. 
Some dissents are written to convey a Justice's 
individual views. They have an expressive function, as they 
enable a Judge to relieve her or his conscience. Rather 
than silently assent to a position of which they disapprove, 
Justices have an opportunity to express their convictions. 60 
The audience in this situation is not the members of the 
Court, for their votes are lost. Rather, this sort of 
opinion is written to contemporaries off the Court. 61 Other 
dissents are written to one's colleagues on the bench. In 
this situation, a Justice may temper his or her remarks in 
exchange for a maJority opinion which is restricted or 
limited in scope.62 Simply knowing that other Justices may 
look for errors and ambiguities will influence the author of 
the majority opinion to craft the argument more carefully 
59 Barth, p. xii. 
60 Moorhead, p. 822. 
61 Barth, p. 3. 
62 Jacob, p. 223. 
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than she or he would otherwise. 63 A dissent forces the 
majority to write good opinions or risk public discontent 
and scorn. In this sense, dissents improve the entire 
judicial process. Tussman says that "the tradition of 
dissenting opinions makes publicly apparent the conflicting 
strains within the court, develops counterarguments of great 
power, and pushes the court into greater depth of analysis--
to everyone's profit."64 Sometimes dissents are written 
specifically for the purpose of shaping future law. A well-
reasoned dissent can determine the direction of new law when 
circumstances or Court personnel change.65 Lawyers, for 
instance, often take these opinions as clues about how to 
argue future cases. One example of a dissenting opinion 
becoming future law is Justice Black's argument in Betts~ 
Brady. Black argued that indigent defendants in criminal 
cas~s should be given free attorney assistance. Twenty-one 
years later, the Supreme Court reversed Betts in Gideon~ 
Wainwright. Ironically, Black wrote the majority opinion 
guaranteeing the right to an attorney for indigent criminal 
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.!.!_ Odegaard. 67 Although the Supreme Court held that the 
case was moot, Justice Douglas wrote an opinion claiming the 
Court should have upheld DeFunis's claim of discrimination 
in admission to a law school even though the school admitted 
him before the Court heard the case. As a result of the 
dissent, many schools have changed their practices "in 
anticipation of a later Court decision in which the opinion 
prevails."68 In other instances, dissents have been direct 
appeals to Congress, the President, the bar, and the public 
"to change the opinion of the maJority."69 
Compared to maJority opinions, dissenting opinions are 
highly flexible. They can be attempts to criticize, caJole, 
and condemn. While Justices have more freedom in writing 
them, they must disagree in a responsible manner. Hence, 
critics can analyze the clarity and reasoning of these 
opinions and demand that they meet many of the same 
requirements as maJority opinions. However, as there is no 
set audience for a dissenter, criticism based on poor 
adaptation must make a strong case regarding the target 
audience. 
67 DeFunis .!.!_ Odegaard, 94 S.Ct. 1704 (1974). 
68 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, 1978), pp. 224-225. 
69 Grey, p. 418. 
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Chapter III 
The Abortion Funding Controversy 
Numerous forces contribute to the abortion funding 
dispute, and they are significant because they constrain 
opinion writers, thereby shaping the rhetorical choices 
available to them. Several potential audiences for Supreme 
Court opinions have been identified, and Justices must write 
with an eye to the needs and expectations of those 
audiences. Whether a Court opinion will stand or fall 
ultimately depends on the perceptions of future Supreme 
Courts (who may overturn), the various legislatures (who may 
change the statutes in question), and the attentive public 
(who may potentially influence any of these other agents). 
In these ways, the Supreme Court is often constrained in its 
decisions by public opinion, legislative action, and 
Judicial precedent; yet, at other times, the Court not only 
mirrors society but also shapes society. It can, for 
example, change popular attitudes about blacks and women, 
overturn laws governing criminal procedures, and create new 
precedents governing free speech. 70 Thus, it can be said 
that the Supreme Court interacts with public opinion, 
70 Barth, p. 9. 
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legislative action, and Judicial precedent in a complex 
fashion. More importantly, even if one cannot link these 
three factors as direct causal connections to the particular 
wording of an opinion, prevailing attitudes, actions, and 
court cases are important benchmarks by which a rhetorical 
critic may assess how well an opinion is adapted to its 
audiences. 
Walter Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus conducted a 
sophisticated analysis of public opinion and the Supreme 
Court. Their preliminary report indicates that the Court is 
accorded diffuse support which "dips far beneath the Court's 
attentive public into the more articulate layers of the less 
knowledgeable." 71 This dispersion of social support allows 
the Court a measure of latitude when taking public opinion 
into account. Since every decision will probably be 
applauded by some and criticized by others, there is no 
compulsion to attempt to appeal to popular sentiment. 
Nonetheless, the institution must maintain its credibility 
despite the inevitable differences of opinion. The Court 
' does this, in part, by appearing to be apolitical. Even if 
Justices disagree, there is no problem if the populace 
perceives a conscientious basis for the dissent. 
Evans Hughes wrote in 1928 that: 
Charles 
71 Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, "Public Opinion 
and the United States Supreme Court: Mapping of Some 
Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime Changes," 
Law and Society Review, Vol. 2, May 1968, p. 373. 
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what must ultimately sustain the Court 
is public confidence in the character and 
independence of the Judges. They are 
not there simply to decide cases, but to 
decide them as they think they should be 
decided, and while it may be regrettable 
that they cannot always agree, it is better 
that their independence should be main-
tained and recognized than that unanimity 
should be secured through its sacrifice. 7 2 
The Justices may reflect the mood of society, they may 
attempt to change it, and they may disagree with each other. 
As long as they appear to be conscientious and independent, 
they can either ignore other social factors or mirror them 
completely. 
Since the Court has no power of enforcement, compliance 
with its decisions is dependent on the response of various 
state legislatures and the two houses of Congress. 
Historically, Congress has taken advantage of the Court's 
impotence to "weaken or completely blunt the impact of 
Judicial decisions."73 Even when there is compliance, it is 
often uncertain and slow. Jacob attempted to discover why 
compliance varies and isolated two factors: the clarity and 
the division of the decision. He found greater compliance 
when the decrees provide clear specifications and when the 
Justices take a similar stance on the issues. 74 Although 
72 Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United 
States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), pp. 67-
68. 
73 John R. Schmidhauser and Larry L. Berg, The Supreme 
Court and Congress (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 7. 
74 Jacob, p. 230. 
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the Supreme Court can strike down any law in this country, 
it must do so unambiguously in order to ensure compliance 
with its decisions. 
Courts get their authority from legislatures and public 
sentiments. One condition for "a positive flow of supports" 
is that "the courts must operate in a Judicial manner." 75 
As Felix Frankfurter put it, "The judicial process demands 
that a Judge move within the framework of relevant legal 
rules and the covenanted modes of thought for ascertaining 
them." 76 Thus, action within the judicial system is an 
important determinant of legitimacy outside the system. 
Justice Frankfurter explains that judges are constrained by 
the need to be rational: "Courts can fulfill their 
responsibility in a democratic society only to the extent 
that they succeed in shaping their Judgments by rational 
standards, and rational standards are both impersonal and 
communicable." 77 Justices must clearly articulate their 
criteria without relying on emotion, and they do this most 
effectively when they appear to ground their decisions in 
stare decisis. Stare decisis is the authority of the past, 
75 Sheldon Goldman and Thomas P. Jahnige, The Federal 
Judicial System: Readings .!l! Process and Behavior (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), p. 76. 
76 In, Public Utilities Commission .Y.!.. Pollock, 343 U.S. 
466-467 (1959). 
77 In, American Federation of Labor.!.!.. American Sash and 
Do o r Co • , 3 3 5 U. S • 5 3 8 ( 1 9 4 9)':'° 
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the reliance on or adherence to previously decided cases. 
It is vital to the image of the Judiciary, as Justice Edward 
White explains: 
The fundamental conception of a Judicial 
body is that of one hedged about by 
precedents which are binding on the court 
without regard to the personality of its 
members. Break down this belief in Ju-
dicial continuity, and let it be felt on 
great constitutional questions this court 
is to depart from the settled conclusions 
of its predecessors, and to determine them 
according to the mere opinion of those who 
temporarily fill its bench, and our Con-
stitution will, in my judgment, be bereft of 
value and become a most dangerous instrument 
to the rights and liberties of the people.78 
Judges have the highest respect for precedent. Precedents 
legitimize decisions by making them applications of prior 
legal concepts, rather than novel constructions based upon 
individual preferences. 79 It is through the skillful use of 
precedent that an opinion can gain public acceptance and 
legislative compliance. 
Social, legislative, and Judicial factors influenced 
the opinion in Beal. My claim is not that one can trace 
them as directly causal factors leading to the decision, but 
rather that each of them contributes to the difficulties of 
the opinion writers. The extent to which each factor 
contributes to an opinion is not ascertainable because that 
could only be known by examining how the individual opinion 
78 In, Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 
429, 652 (1895), dissenting opinion. 
79 Barth, p. 14. 
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writers interpret the forces bearing upon them. 
Nonetheless, these factors may be examined in order to show 
the direction in which a constraint operated. We cannot 
know what goes on inside the mind of a Judge, but it may be 
possible to say that judges who were sensitive to these 
various forces would be more likely to decide in a given 
way. Furthermore, it is essential to examine the impacts of 
the Beal decision as this allows a critic to assess the 
reasoning of that opinion. Analysis of the impact of Beal 
will help confirm or deny the reasonableness of the opinion 
writers' claims. 
The Public Debate 
Nellie J. Gray, president of March for Life, Inc., once 
remarked, "There's no middle ground on abortion. You can't 
have a little bit of abortion."8 0 Indeed, abortion, like 
pregnancy, represents an all or nothing physical choice. 
Emotionally, it often represents the same mental exclu-
sivity. On one extreme is the passionate plea to save the 
innocent fetus from a premeditated murder. On the other, a 
cry for freedom from the slavery of unwanted tissue.81 
BO "Another Storm Brewing Over Abortion," U.S. News and 
World Report, July 24, 1978, p. 63. 
81 Roger Shinn, "Paying for Abortions: Is the Court 
Wrong?" Christianity and Crisis, September 19, 1977, p. 203. 
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Those who oppose abortion began a strong lobbying 
effort in 1973 as a result of the Supreme Court decision in 
Roe .Y..!.. Wade affirming the right to terminate early. One of 
the most consistent goals among the diverse groups who decry 
abortion is congressional passage of a Human Life Amendment. 
This proposal would guarantee constitutional protection for 
all fetuses beginning at the moment of fertilization. 82 
While these groups stand together on the issue, they do so 
for a variety of reasons and in numerous ways. Some "Right-
to-Lifers" do not want women to gain control over their 
reproductive systems. Others view pregnancy as punishment 
for sexual promiscuity, and many oppose abortion for 
religious reasons. Various subgroups adopt a combination of 
these views.83 Anti-abortion lobbyists have staged protests 
at the grass roots level by picketing abortion clinics and 
marching in Washington, D.C. They managed to muster enough 
support to put a referendum on an Oregon ballot that called 
for a vote on public finance of early terminations.84 
Cardinal Humberto Medeiros issued a letter to Catholics 
before a congressional primary in Massachusetts. He urged 
them to "save our children, born and unborn. Those who 
make abortions possible by law--namely legislators and 
82 Lisa Cronin Wohl, "Backstage With the Antiabortion 
Forces," Ms., February 1978, p. 47. 
83 Deborah Baldwin, "Abortion: The Liberals Have Abandoned 
the Poor," Progressive, September 1980, p. 30. 
84 "Another Storm Brewing Over Abortion," p. 63. 
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those who promote, defend and elect these same lawmakers--
cannot separate themselves totally from that guilt which 
accompanies this horrendous crime and deadly sin."85 
At the national level, the anti-abortion movement has 
been in evidence, typified by the efforts of the "religious" 
or "new" right. This group is also a collection of 
subgroups, and it focuses primarily on influencing 
elections. Judie Brown, spokesperson for a coalition of 
conservative and religious groups known as the National 
Right to Life Committee, expresses the views of her group: 
"Members of Congress who choose to ignore the pro-life 
attitudes among the maJority of people in this country will 
be reminded of their action at the polls."86 
The right to life groups have claimed victories in 
several past elections, and they vow to intensify the 
struggle. 87 In stark opposition to these forces are 
organizations who support the right of women freely to 
choose early termination. However these groups were not 
very active between 1973 and 1977 because they saw no need 
for lobbying. After the 1973 Court decisions, abortions 
were perceived as legal, and the pro-choice groups had no 
85 "Pulpits and Politics, 
1980, p. 9. 
1980," Church and State, November 
86 "Fight Over Abortions--Heating Up Again," U.S. News and 
World Report, December 19, 1977, p. 68. 
87 Paul Weyrich, "Right to Fight," Commonweal, October 9, 
1981, p. 556. 
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reason to vocalize. Carol Werner, legislative director of 
the National Abortion Rights Action League, stated as late 
as 1978: "There's a broad base of support for abortion in 
this country. But our supporters are simply not active.1188 
Even within the National Organization of Women there is 
noticeable reticence. In 1980, abortion rights played 
"second fiddle to the ERA."8 9 The group was reluctant to 
let abortion stand in the way of gaining broad-based support 
for the ERA. 
Primarily because the 1973 abortion rulings were 
favorable, the pro-choice forces were, in comparison to the 
right to life groups, silent. Supreme Court Justices who 
were aware of the political activity at that time would 
have seen a highly visible anti-abortion force that was 
virtually unopposed publicly. 
While various pro-life organizations waged a one-sided 
battle condemning the Supreme Court's 1973 decisions, public 
opinion on the issue was difficult to gauge. Mary Segers 
looked at a variety of opinion polls and found anywhere from 
sixty-seven percent of the public accepting free choice by 
women in one poll, to fifty-four percent in another survey 
saying they should only be allowed in certain circumstances. 90 
88 
89 
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Her overall assessment is that "the search for a numerical 
maJority on the issue of restricting abortion is something 
like a search for the Holy Grail. It all depends on which 
poll you read."9l For the most part, public opinion was not 
decidedly in either camp, and this uncertainty was 
encouraging to the right-to-lifers who wished to change the 
status .9..!!.Q.• 
With the 1977 Court decisions, the abortion debate 
intensified. The pro-abortionists saw their rights slipping 
away, while the anti-abortionists detected a partial, yet 
important, victory. The lines of conflict were drawn 
clearly. Opponents of funding "contend that abortion is 
murder and that, by providing federal or state subsidies for 
such action, the government becomes directly involved in the 
taking of a human life. Proponents of Medicaid payments 
maintain that the views of those who believe that abortion 
is immoral should not be thrust upon those who believe 
otherwise."92 Not surprisingly, the opponents heralded the 
Court opinions with a tidal wave of "Jubilation." 93 Within 
religious circles--especially evangelicals and Catholics--
the decisions were Joyously received. These groups remain 
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"led to promises of renewed efforts in the next Congress to 
push through a constitutional amendment banning abortion 
itself." 94 
The proponents of free choice were profoundly 
dissatisfied with Beal and Maher. The National Abortion 
Rights Action League began establishing a political fund 
designed to elect like-minded congressional candidates. 
Several other groups, including the American Civil Liberties 
Union, began the complicated process of challenging the 
decisions in court.95 The Planned Parenthood Federation of 
America established a special fund to provide free abortions 
to women who were unable to obtain governmental 
assistance.9 6 To call the 1977 rulings a spark to a pro-
abortion drive would be an understatement. This was the end 
of hesitation and a signal for even greater militancy in the 
future; it was a strong indication that prevailing views on 
abortion at the time prior to Beal were unrepresentative of 
the entire population. Pro-choice forces may have been 
viewed as non-existent when, actually, their views were 
dormant. 
As was true earlier in the abortion debate, public 
opinion was difficult to gauge. An ABC News-Harris Survey 
94 Stan Hastey, "Religion and the Courts," Church and 
State, September 1980, p. 16. 
95 
96 
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in 1979 showed public support of the 1973 decisions by a 
sixty percent to thirty-seven percent margin.9 7 When the 
question related to public funding, pollsters found 
different views. A CBS poll in 1978 showed that only forty-
four percent of Democrats and thirty-seven percent of 
Republicans favored publicly funded abortions.98 An earlier 
CBS-New York Times survey revealed that only thirty-eight 
percent of those interviewed favored government aid for 
abortion while sixty-four percent thought the government 
should pick up the tab for childbirth.99 These results are 
helpful to an understanding of the social context 
surrounding abortion; they will also become important when 
viewing the legislative response to the Supreme Court 
decisions. 
Impact on Women 
One of the most important social factors to be 
considered in this controversy is the impact of free and 
legal abortions on women. The Wade decision of 1973 was 
quite significant in this regard. As measured by government 
estimates, the annual number of abortions in the United 
97 "Abortion Poll," Church and State, May 1979, p. 22. 
98 Albert Menendez, "Church, State and the 1980 
Presidential Race," Church and State, January 1980, p. 7. 
99 Richard A. McCormick, "Paying for Abortions: Is the 
Court Wrong?" Christianity and Crisis, September 19, 1977, 
p. 205. 
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States Jumped from 744,600 before Wade, to 1.5 million after 
Wade. More than a million teenagers become pregnant each 
year, and thirty-eight percent of them abort.lOO Comparing 
live births to abortions, the Center for Disease Control 
found that roughly one out of every four pregnancies in 1976 
was terminated' early.IOI In 1977, the average cost of an 
abortion, excluding travel and employment expenses, ranged 
from $125 to $250. 102 Of the total yearly number of 
abortions (ranging from 1.1 to 1.5 million), over 300,000 
were paid for by Medicaid. 103 Thus, the numerical 
significance of Wade amounted to a doubling of the number of 
recorded abortions, with a significant number funded by the 
federal and state governments. 
Numbers do not tell the entire story, for the impact of 
Wade was widespread. Before abortion became legal for any 
reason in the first trimester, most women had two simple 
options--bear an unwanted child or seek an illegal 
procedure. If an individual chose to carry pregnancy to 
full term, there were several potential problems. First, 
because legal abortions carry fewer risks of complications, 
lOO Walter Isaacson, "The Battle Over Abortion," Time, 
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women were subJecting themselves to a greater chance of 
death or injury. Christopher Tietze and Sarah Lewit did an 
extensive analysis of death rates between 1966 and 1976. 
They found that the death rate for legal abortions performed 
in the first twelve weeks of pregnancy is "far lower" than 
it is for full pregnancies. They observed: "The abortion 
death rate increases with the duration of pregnancy. 
For all age groups the death rate for first-trimester 
. . . 
abortion is substantially lower than the rate for 
childbirth."1o4 Other writers have observed that: "Since 
abortions have been safe and legal, the death rate is down 
to five times less than that for live births."105 
A second problem with compulsory pregnancy is that it 
creates severe mental stress on mothers. These unwanted 
children are often born to poor women who cannot afford to 
travel to a state or county where abortions are legal. The 
children can symbolize, every day, the despair and 
hopelessness of the mother's existence. This can create a 
"terrible cycle of unwanted children, child battering, 
and hopelessness in the slums. ttl06 • • • Another 
writer suggests that, "for those women who are forced to 
bear unwanted children, emotional and psychological effects 
104 Christopher Tietze and Sarah Lewit, "Legal Abortion," 
Scientific American, January 1977, pp. 26-27. 
105 Wohl, p. 48. 
l06 Lance Morrow, "An Essay on the Unfairness of Life," 
Horizon, December 1977, p. 37. 
41 
upon the mother and child are inevitable."107 A task force 
report to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
found that, for many women, the only alternatives to 
abortion are suicide and madness.108 
Those women who chose the alternative of illegal 
abortion also placed themselves at risk of death and inJury. 
The tendency to choose this alternative was very strong: 
"Ultimately, the question is not between the abortion and no 
abortion but between legal abortion and illegal 
abortion." 10 9 Dr. Kenneth Edelin, convicted of manslaughter 
for performing an abortion, had this to say: "Women will go 
to any length, will risk their lives, to get abortions.nllO 
Women risk their lives when they undergo an illegal 
procedure. The legalization of abortion corresponded with a 
significant drop in death rates from complications. After 
1973, "patient deaths dropped to scarcely one-fifth their 
prior level."111 "Back alley" or illegal abortions carry 
substantial health risks. 
Admittedly, these statistics do not account for fetal 
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balance maternal harms from decreased abortion accessibility 
with harms to the unborn's potential or actual life, 
decreases in society's level of respect for the quality of 
life, loss of national productivity, or any of a number of 
other evils attributed to legalized abortions. The 
arguments could be extended to account for harm to the 
unborn, but such arguments make the assumption that fetuses 
are human beings, and have rights which outweigh those of 
the mother. That assumption is clearly beyond the scope of 
this paper. Since the Supreme Court declared in Wade that 
the woman's rights outweigh the state's interest in 
protecting the fetus during the first trimester, as will be 
shown later in this paper, it is appropriate to presume that 
the relevant consideration is maternal, not fetal, harm. If 
the Supreme Court wished to remain entirely consistent with 
Wade, then it would presume that women have the option to 
choose abortion, but the question of who would fund remained 
to be resolved. Given the importance of abortions to the 
health and well-being of many women, justices who were 
concerned with this social force would be inclined to 
support pro-choice. There is little evidence to support a 
view that the Beal maJority is particularly sensitive to 
the difficulties of woman who choose to terminate early. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court decisions in 1977 may uphold 
the principle of legalized abortions while frustrating the 
efforts of poor women to exercise the option guaranteed in 
1973. 
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The maJority decision in Beal did not directly cause 
any women to delay or forego abortions, because the decision 
gives the states discretion in choosing to fund abortion. 
However, the state response to the removal of compulsory 
funding was predictable, making many poor women the indirect 
victims of the Court's decision. Many states have cut 
Medicaid funds for abortion, and there is already some 
confirmation of the effects of that denial. In Arkansas, 
the yearly number of abortions paid for by the state has 
dropped from five hundred to five; South Carolina has gone 
from fourteen hundred to fourteen; and Texas has dropped 
from over thirteen thousand to fifty-one. 112 Under New 
Jersey law, funds are available for abortions only if the 
mother's life is in danger. Abortions there have decreased 
from nine hundred to twenty-five per month. California has 
reduced its reimbursements by ninety-five percent. 113 Of 
course, these figures show a decline in public funds; many 
women are still getting abortions. Some are offered reduced 
charges at clinics, while others are getting cheaper 
procedures from unlicensed practitioners. The rest are 
continuing with a full term pregnancy. 114 
112 "Another Storm Brewing Over Abortion," p. 63. 
113 Charles Juster, "Availability 
Abortions," Washington and Lee Law 
451. 
of Medicaid Funded 
Review, Vol. 37, 1980, p. 
114 "Another Storm Brewing Over Abortion," p. 63. 
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The Department of HEW estimated in 1974 that 
elimination of funds for elective abortions could cause 
approximately one hundred and twenty-five to two hundred and 
fifty women to die from self-induced abortions. Another 
twenty-five thousand women would not die, but could have 
serious complications.115 Dr. Diana Petitti and Dr. William 
Cates undertook a more complex formulation. They argued 
that denial of public monies could lead to increased death 
from childbirth, or excess deaths from non-legal services, 
or additional mortality as women delay the procedure in 
order to seek alternative funding. The study found that, 
"If difficulty in obtaining funds for abortion resulted in 
an average delay of only two weeks for each legal 
abortion. . . it would have increased the death-to-case 
rate for women eventually having abortions with public funds 
by nearly sixty percent, and raised the overall national 
abortion death-to-case rate by twenty-one percent."1!6 
Their overall conclusion assumed both best case and worst 
case scenarios: "if publicly funded abortions were 
restricted, we have calculated that from five to ninety 
excess deaths would result for women of childbearing age in 
the United States depending on the distribution of the above 
115 Norman, p. 311. 
116 Diana B. Petitti and Willard Cates, Jr., "Restricting 
Medicaid Funds for Abortions: Projections of Excess 
Mortality for Women of Childbearing Age," American Journal 
of Public Health, Vol. 67, No. 9, September 1977, pp. 860-
861. 
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options chosen by pregnant women whose public funding has 
been denied."117 It is important to remember that these are 
annual figures. These deaths could be expected every year 
that funding was restricted. Also, this analysis excludes 
the mental stress and poverty associated with unwanted 
children. Furthermore, the calculation ignores the 
additional social cost of government-paid childbirth, extra 
family members on welfare, and follow-up treatment for 
botched abortions. 
Government Legislation 
Beal, the ruling that states may fund abortions if they 
choose to, places the funding decision solely in the hands 
of state and federal legislatures. The refusal to fund most 
abortions has been documented, and it is important to trace 
the legislative history and policymakers' responses to 
abortion to understand additional forces involved in the 
funding issue. 
Under common law, abortions were legal until, in the 
nineteenth century, states began prohibiting the 
procedure. 118 Prior to 1973, thirty-one states prohibited 
117 Ibid., p. 861. 
118 Patricia A. Butler, "The Right to Medicaid Payment for 
Abortion," Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 28, March 1977, p. 
931. 
46 
abortions except when the woman's life was at stake; 
fourteen other states had a general prohibition, but made 
exceptions in a wider variety of circumstances: jeopardy to 
a woman's mental health, potential for fetal deformity, 
conception as a result of rape or incest; and the remaining 
states were noted for having even more liberal statutes. 11 9 
These various state schemes remained in effect until 1973 
when they were effectively voided by Wade and Bolton. 
However, even after these two decisions, abortions were not 
freely available. Several states acted to require parental 
consent in cases involving minors and the husband's consent 
in cases involving married women. Most Catholic hospitals 
do not perform abortions, and many other hospitals "are 
reluctant to allow abortions or even set up the necessary 
facilities." 120 A study by the Alan Guttmacher Institute 
found that between 400,000 and 1 million women were denied 
abortions they sought in 1974. 121 
In order to provide medical assistance to needy 
individuals, Congress in 1970 enacted Title XIX of the 
Social Security Act, 122 establishing the Medical Assistance 
Program [Medicaid]. The program provides a system of 
119 
120 
Susman, p. 581. 
Tietze and Lewit, p. 22. 
121 George H. Kieffer, Bioethics (Reading, Ma.: 
Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p. 161. 
Addison-
122 42 U.S.C. *1396 et seq. (1970), as amended by Act of 
August 9, 1975, Public Law 94-437, *402(a), 90 Stat. 1409. 
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reimbursement for health care costs, but does not directly 
secure or guarantee a physician's services or medical 
facilities. 123 State participation in the program is 
optional, but if a state elects to Join, then it is subJect 
to statutory requirements. 124 The state must provide care in 
five general categories, 125 but not necessarily all types of 
123 42 u.s.c. *1396 states: "For the purpose of enabling 
each State, as far as practicable under the conditions in 
each State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of 
families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or 
disabled individuals, whose income and resources are 
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical 
services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help 
such families and individuals attain or retain capability 
for independence or self-care, there is hereby authorized to 
be appropriated for each fiscal year a sum sufficient to 
carry out the purposes of this subchapter. The sums made 
available under this section shall be used for making 
payments to States which have submitted and approved by the 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, State plans for 
medical assistance." 
124 42 U.S.C. *1396a(a)(l) requires that a State medical 
assistance plan "provide that it shall be in effect in all 
political subdivisions of the State, and if administered by 
them, be mandatory upon them." 
125The five categories of care are enumerated in 
*1396d(a)(1970 ed. and Supp. V): 
"(1) inpatient hospital services (other than services in an 
institution for tuberculosis or mental diseases); 
"(2) outpatient hospital services; 
"(3) other laboratory and X-ray services; 
"(4)(A) skilled nursing facility services (other than 
services in an institution for tuberculosis or mental 
diseases) for individuals 21 years of age or older (B) 
effective July 1, 1969, such early and periodic screening 
and diagnosis of individuals who are eligible under the plan 
and are under the age of 21 to ascertain their physical or 
mental defects, and such health care, treatment, and other 
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treatment within those categories. 126 Standards also 
require that definitions of eligibility and scope of 
coverage must be consistent with the obJective of providing 
necessary medical services in a manner upholding the best 
interests of the recipient. A State medical assistance plan 
must "provide such safeguards as may be necessary to assure 
that eligibility for care and services will be provided in a 
manner consistent with simplicity of administration and the 
best interests of the recipient."127 In 1972, the statute 
was amended to include family planning services, although it 
did not specifically mention abortion.128 
measures to correct or ameliorate defects and chronic 
conditions discovered thereby, as may be provided in 
regulations of the Secretary; and (C) family planning 
services and supplies furnished (directly or under 
arrangements with others) to individuals of childbearing age 
(including minors who can be considered to be sexually 
active) who are eligible under the State plan and who desire 
such services and supplies; 
"(5) physicians' services furnished by a physician (as 
defined in section 1395x(r)(l) of this title), whether 
furnished in the office, the patient's home, a hospital, or 
a skilled nursing facility, or elsewhere." 
126 Rowland L. Young, "Supreme Court Report," American Bar 
Association Journal, Vol. 63, September 1977, p. 1261. 
U.S.C. *1396a(a)(l 7) requires State plans to "include 
reasonable standards ••• for determining eligibility for 
and the extent of medical assistance under the plan which 
are consistent with the obJectives of this subchapter •••• " 
127 42 U.S.C. *1396a(a)(19)(1970). 
128 Act of October 30, 1972, Public Law No. 92-603, 
*299E, 86 Stat. 1462. 
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A maJor legislative action dealing with Medicaid 
abortions took place at the federal level. In 1976, while 
Beal, Maher, and Poelker were pending before the Court, 
Congress, over a Presidential veto, passed the Hyde 
Amendment to the Department of HEW and the Department of 
Labor appropriations bill for 1977.129 This rider to the 
appropriations measure eliminated federal payments for 
abortion, except when carrying the fetus to full term 
threatened the life of the mother.130 While Beal allows 
withholding of funds for some abortions, it required 
participating states to pay if the abortion was necessary to 
the physical or mental well-being of the mother. Hyde goes 
beyond this by precluding funds for all abortions which are 
not life-threatening to the woman. 131 Thus, for women 
dependent on federal money for abortions, the Hyde Amendment 
reduces the ability to abort to that freedom which existed 
for all women before 1973. Effectively, these individuals 
would gain nothing from the Court rulings in Wade and 
Bolton. One observer claims that, "the Hyde Amendment, as it 
is known, is intended to offer up poor women as a sacrifice 
to the right-to-life movement. • • • It is simply a symbolic 
129 Act of September 30, 1976, Public Law No. 94-439, 90 
Stat. 1418. 
130 Lalli, p. 690. 
131 Joan Meyerhoefer Roddy, "The Hyde Amendment: An 
Analysis of Its State Progeny," University of Dayton Law 
Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, Summer 1980, p. 314. 
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gesture, which Congress hopes will pacify the right-to-life 
movement at least through the next election."132 Of course, 
the amendment only applied to appropriations in 1977. 133 
After the 1977 decisions were announced, Congress restricted 
1978 appropriations "for all abortions except those where 
the life of the mother is endangered, and in the cases of 
rape, incest or medical necessity."134 Most states have 
followed the federal lead by limiting their funds. 
Abortions under Medicaid are fully funded in only fifteen 
states. 135 Thus, both state and federal legislatures have 
historically restricted the ability to abort. When courts 
have ruled against them, they have grudgingly complied; when 
the judiciary decreased the legislative obligation, 
lawmakers took advantage of the opportunity to decrease 
funds. 
Prior Judicial Activity 
In addition to social and legislative factors, Supreme 
Court decisions are affected by prior Judicial activity. 
The abortion issue was initially addressed by the Supreme 
132 Michael Kinsley, "Danse Macabre," New Republic, 




Butler, p. 977. 
Norman, p. 310. 
"Another Storm Brewing Over Abortion," p. 63. 
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Court with its decisions in 1973 in Roe.!.!.. Wade and Doe.!.!. 
Bolton. These cases first enabled women legally to obtain 
abortions. While not addressing the funding issue, these 
decisions are important to an understanding of Beal because 
they allow abortions within the first three and six months 
of pregnancy. In Wade, the petitioner challenged Texas 
statutes which made it a crime to abort, unless the woman's 
life was at stake. 136 The Court held that the ability to 
obtain an abortion was encompassed within the 
constitutionally protected right to privacy.137 Further, 
this extension of a right was deemed "fundamental," and the 
Court required that a state demonstrate a compelling state 
interest before interfering with the abortion decision. The 
Court recognized a state interest in protecting the mother's 
health and the potential life of the fetus, but held that 
these interests were not compelling during the first 
trimester of pregnancy. 138 During the first trimester, the 
medical decision of the woman's physician is to be the 
controlling factor. 139 During the second trimester the 
state's interest in the woman's health becomes predominant 
over her freedom of choice. Only in the third trimester 
does the state's interest reach a "compelling point," at 
136 Texas Penal Code Ann. arts. 1191-1194 and 1196. 
137 Wade, 153. 
138 Wade, 162-165. 
139 Wade, 163-164. 
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which time the state may protect the potential human 
life. 140 
In the companion case of Bolton, an indigent woman was 
denied an abortion because she failed to meet the State of 
Georgia's requirement that a panel of physicians certify 
that continued pregnancy would be life-threatening. 141 The 
Supreme Court ruled that the statute was in violation of the 
fourteenth amendment--the same grounds as were used in 
Wade.14 2 The Court held that the certification procedure 
did not further a compelling state interest and restricted 
the choice made between patient and physician.143 These 
cases, taken together, were interpreted by lower courts "to 
mean that a state could not favor a woman's election to 
carry a pregnancy to term over a decision to terminate the 
pregnancy. 11144 What these decisions did not do was settle 
the extent to which a state must provide equal access to 
abortions, not Just equal opportunity to them. 
140 Wade, 164-166. 






144 Dennis J. Horan and Thomas J. Marzen, "The Moral 
Interest of the State in Abortion Funding: A Comment on 
Beal, Maher, and Poelker," Saint Louis University Law 
Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1978, pp. 572-573. 
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After Wade and Bolton, a number of federal cases were 
heard in lower and appellate courts to determine if a state 
must provide Medicaid funds for abortions. Obviously, these 
lower court rulings are not legally binding upon the Supreme 
Court: these cases are not "precedents" in a strict sense. 
Nonetheless, they illustrate how other courts have decided 
similar cases and provide foundations upon which the Beal 
court could have constructed its opinion. The lower court 
opinions also provide alternative views that a critic may 
use when assessing the Beal decision. 
Several cases considered the statutory question of 
whether compliance with Title XIX required state funding, 
others decided the constitutional issue of whether a state's 
decision to withhold money for abortions violated the 
fourteenth amendment, and a few considered both. The first 
important decision relating to Medicaid funding was Klein .Y..!.. 
Nassau County Medical Center. 145 In 1972, a federal 
district court predated both Wade and Bolton when 
considering the case of an indigent woman who challenged a 
New York welfare policy that denied coverage for non-
therapeutic abortions. The three-Judge panel considered the 
statutory question, and held that Title XIX required states 
145 Klein.!.!.. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F.Supp. 496 
(E.D.N.Y.) (1972) (three-Judge panel), vacated (in light of 
Wade and Bolton, 412 U.S. 925, 37 L.Ed.2d 151, 93 S.Ct.2747 
(1973), on remand, 409 F.Supp. 731, (E.D.N.Y.) (1976) (three 
Judge panel), vacated sub. nom. Toia v. Klein, 97 S.Ct. 2962 
(1972). -
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to provide necessary medical treatment for pregnancy. 
Abortion was considered a necessary treatment Just like 
full-term deliveries; thus, it must be funded. 146 Further, 
the court ruled that providing assistance to women who carry 
to full term but not for those who choose to abort 
constituted an arbitrary classification that violated 
constitutional guarantees of equal protection.14 7 Klein 
became the earliest case to rule on constitutional grounds 
that Medicaid required payments for abortions.1 4 8 Although 
the decision was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court 
in light of Wade and Bolton, numerous courts have followed 
this reasoning to invalidate "restrictive Medicaid statutes 
on constitutional grounds."149 
In Doe~ Wohlgemuth a three-Judge panel reJected the 
argument that Medicaid requires payment for abortion. 150 
The district court found, however, that abortions were a 
necessary medical procedure and that limitations of funding 
were unconstitutional by discriminating "between indigent 
women who choose to carry their pregnancies to birth, and 
indigent women who choose to terminate their pregnancies by 
146 Klein, 347 F.Supp., 500. 
147 Klein, 347 F.Supp., 500-501. 
148 Gall-Clayton, p. 56. 
149 Okerson, p. 184. 
l SO Doe .!.!.. W oh 1 gem u th, 3 7 6 F. Supp. I 7 3 ( W. D. Pa.) ( 197 4) , 
modified sub. no m. Doe v. Be a 1, 5 2 3 F. 2 d 611 ( 3 d Cir.) ( 19 7 5), 
certiorari granted, 96 S:-ct. 3220 (1976). 
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abortion." 151 In determining abortion to be medically 
necessary, the court cited Wade, saying that the procedure, 
"may prevent specific and direct harm which is medically 
diagnosable, may protect the woman's future mental and 
physical health, and may prevent the distress associated 
with the unwanted pregnancy and child."15 2 This decision is 
critical because it is the earliest version of Beal. When 
the Third Circuit reconsidered this case it was titled Doe 
v. Beal.153 
In the case of Doe.!.!.. Rose,1 54 the district court 
considered the constitutional problem posed by 
discriminating against the class of indigent women who 
prefer abortion. The court invalidated a Utah policy which 
only funded abortions in the event of a threat to the 
mother's life or impairment of her physical health. 155 On 
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, saying that money was 
not a sufficiently compelling state interest Justifying 
restriction when fundamental rights were at stake. 156 
151 Wohlgemuth, 376 F.Supp., 191. 
152 Wohlgemuth, 376 F.Supp., 190, citing Wade, 153. 
153 Doe .Y.!.. Beal, 523 F.2d 611 (3d Cir.) (1975), certiorari 
granted, 96 S.Ct. 3220 (1976). 
15 4 Do e v • R o s e , 3 8 0 F. S u p p • ( D. U ta h) ( 1 9 7 3 ) , a f f i r m e d , 4 9 9 
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Another case which ruled on the constitutional issue 
was Wulff.!.!.. Singleton.157 In the original complaint, two 
physicians who performed abortions for Medicaid recipients 
challenged a Missouri statute prohibiting funds for elective 
abortions. The district court originally dismissed the case 
on the grounds that the doctors did not have standing to sue 
on behalf of their patients. Accordingly, because of this 
procedural problem, the constitutional question was not 
raised. The appellate court overruled, granting the 
physicians standing; the court then determined that there 
was no need to remand to the district court because the case 
was clear and could be decided at that time.158 It then 
ruled that the Missouri statue was "obviously unconstitu-
tional •• , a clear violation the Equal Protection Clause.11159 
The Supreme Court heard the case on appeal and affirmed 
the finding that the doctors had standing to assert the 
rights of their patients. 160 However, the Court remanded 
the case to the original court because the appellate Court 
had erred. The constitutional argument was irrelevant 
because the appellate court, after overruling the procedural 
15 7 W u 1 f f .Y..!.. S in g 1 e t o n , 5 0 8 F. 2 d 1 2 1 1 ( 8 t h C i r .) ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 
revising, Wulff~ State Board .Qi. Registration for Healing 
Arts, 3 8 0 F. Supp. 113 7 ( E. D. Mo.) ( 197 4), reversed and 
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issue, should have remanded the case to the district court 
for it to decide the statute's constitutionality. 161 By the 
time the case came before the district court it was 
dismissed in light of Beal and Maher. 1 6 2 
A case involving the Title XIX statute came before the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 163 In Roe~ Ferguson, 
appellants challenged an Ohio statute prohibiting state 
funds for abortion unless the procedure was needed to 
preserve the mother's health or life. They argued that the 
statute was inconsistent with Title xrx. 164 The court held 
that since Title XIX did not mention abortion, it was 
"difficult to construe the silence of Congress in Title XIX 
as an endorsement of the view that nontherapeutic abortions 
are included in the 'necessary medical services' to be 
furnished." 165 The court was reluctant to infer 
Congressional intent and denied the claim; the court 
remanded the case to the district court so that it could 
decide if the state regulation violated the Constitution. 166 
161 Singleton, 428 U.S. 119-121. 
162 Gall-Clayton, p. 75. 
163 Roe.!.!.. Ferguson, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir.) (1975). 
Hereafter referred to as Ferguson. 
164 Ferguson, 280. 
165 Ferguson, 283. 
166 Ferguson, 283-284. 
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Ferguson denied that Congress intended Title XIX to 
require the states to fund abortion. This reasoning, and 
the reasoning in 1975 in Roe~ Norton, 167 formed the basis 
of the Supreme Court decision in Beal. Norton is the early 
version of the Maher case. In Norton, the court held that 
Title XIX neither forbids nor requires payment of elective 
abortion. It argued that the statute did not indicate 
congressional intent to fund early terminations. Further, 
the court relied on an interpretation of the statute by HEW 
which supported the view that Congress expressed no mandate 
within the Medicaid statutes. 1 6 8 Again, the appellate court 
remanded to the district court so that the constitutional 
question could be discussed. The district court found no 
compelling state interest to outweigh the woman's right to 
privacy and ruled against the regulation in question. 169 
As these decisions demonstrate, since Wade and Bolton 
in 1973, courts have generally sustained, under due process 
or equal protection principles, the argument that abortions 
must be funded by Title XIX if childbirth and prenatal care 
are financed. In those few cases claiming a non-
constitutional basis for a requirement of abortion payment 
under Medicaid, the courts have been reluctant to infer that 
167 Roe v. Norton, 408 F.Supp. 660, 664 (D.Conn.) (1975), 
rev'd~b:-nom. Maher. 
168 Roe v. Norton, 552 F.2d 928 (2d Cir.) (1975), rev'd 
sub. ~- Maher. 
169 Roe .!.!_ Norton, 408 F.Supp. 660, 664. 
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Congress intended coverage under the law. The absence of 
any statement by Congress concerning abortion funds has been 
widely interpreted to mean that no preference or compulsion 
has been expressed by the national legislature. On that 
basis, courts have allowed states discretion in determining 
resource allocation policies where no constitutional 
conflict is noted. While this analysis is not exhaustive, 
it suggests the forces which constrain or facilitate the 




Criticism of Beal~ Doe 
Supreme Court opinions may be examined in a number of 
ways and by various criteria. Critics may, for example, 
analyze how an opinion fulfills its purposes, how well the 
rhetoric is adapted to the Court's various audiences, or the 
ways in which the writing style contributes to an 
understanding of the decision. Beal.!.!. Doe may, of course, 
be viewed primarily by the above standards, but the decision 
is far more significant as an example of how language usage 
creates important conceptualizations of situations and 
ultimately is the basis for the rationale of a decision. 
This chapter will indirectly examine the purposes, 
audiences, and writing styles of the two Beal opinions, but 
the emphasis will be first, to demonstrate how the maJority 
opinion functioned rhetorically, and second, to challenge 
the reasoning in that opinion. 
Rhetorical Analysis 
In Beal.!.!_ Doe, the majority opinion by Justice Powell 
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, 
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Rehnquist, and Stevens and the dissent by Brennan, joined by 
Marshall and Blackmun, are concerned with the statutory 
question of whether states violate Title XIX (which includes 
Medicaid) when they deny funds for elective abortions. The 
majority opinion follows an organizational format found 
frequently in Supreme Court decisions. It begins with the 
issue in the case, "whether Title XIX of the Social Security 
Act ••• requires States that participate in the Medical 
Assistance (Medicaid) program to fund the cost of 
nontherapeutic abortions."1 70 Next, the opinion presents 
the facts of the case. Under Pennsylvania's Medicaid 
program, funds for nontherapeutic abortions are available 
only if the procedure is medically necessary.1 71 In a 




(1) There is documented medical evidence 
that continuance of the pregnancy may 
threaten the health of the mother; 
(2) There is documented medical evidence 
that the infant may be born with incapaci-
tating physical deformity or mental defi-
ciency; or 
(3) There is documented medical evidence that 
continuance of a pregnancy resulting from 
legally established statutory or forcible 
rape or incest may constitute a threat to 
the mental or physical health of a patient; 
and 
(4) Two other physicians chosen because of 
their recognized professional competency have 
examined the patient and have concurred in 
writing; and 
Beal, 469. 
Beal, 4 70. 
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(5) The procedure is performed in a hospital 
accredited by the Joint Commission on Accred-
itation of Hospitals. 1 72 
The respondents in the case were denied Medicaid 
assistance for failure to certify properly their medical 
necessity. "Their complaint alleged that Pennsylvania's 
requirement of a certificate of medical necessity 
contravened relevant provisions of Title XIX and denied them 
equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." 173 
, 
The case was first heard in District Court 
where a three-Judge panel ruled that requirements of medical 
necessity did not violate Title XIX, but that the 
Pennsylvania requirement was unconstitutional when applied 
during the first trimester. Thus the statute was upheld, 
but the constitutional question was resolved in favor of the 
plaintiffs. On appeal, the third Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the statutory ruling, arguing that the certificate 
of necessity was prohibited under Title XIX. The 
constitutional question became irrelevant, since the 
original plaintiffs could win on either the statutory or 
constitutional issue. Given the statutory reversal, the 
Court of Appeals did not pursue the constitutional 
questions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to 
172 Brief for Petitioners 4, citing 3 Pennsylvania Bulletin 
2207, 2209 (September 29, 1973). 
173 Beal, 4 70. 
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resolve the conflicting decisions. 174 The Supreme Court in 
Beal is concerned solely with the statutory question 
since the constitutional issue was not reached by the Court 
of Appeals. It is important to note that the District Court 
reached the same ultimate conclusion regarding the statute 
as did the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals disagreed 
with the ruling. Hence, the Supreme Court was in a position 
to Justify either of the opposing views while maintaining 
that they upheld the rationale of a prior court decision. 
The Court begins to unfold its position by arguing that 
the statutory language of Title XIX does not require funding 
of all procedures within the general Medicaid categories of 
care. They note that Medicaid merely requires States to 
provide care relating to five broad categories. The law 
does not mention abortions or any specific medical 
procedure. They assert that "nothing in the statute 
suggests that participating States are required to fund 
every medical procedure that falls within the delineated 
categories of medical care."175 The maJority seems to be 
contending that although participating States must provide 
at least some services in each of the five categories of 
care, they need not provide exhaustive coverage within those 
174 Several federal courts have concluded that states are 
not required under Title XIX to fund elective abortions. 
See also, Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928 (CA2 1975), and Roe v. 
Ferguson, 515 °F."2d 279 (CA6 1975). -- --
175 Beal, 471. 
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categories. As proof, the opinion refers to a portion of 
the Medicaid statute itself. It states that the State plan 
for medical assistance must include reasonable standards for 
the extent of care which "are consistent with the 
obJectives ••• " of Title XIX. 176 The maJority uses this 
language to conclude that Title XIX gives States the choice 
as to which standards they adopt: "This language confers 
broad discretion on the States to adopt standards for 
determining the extent of medical assistance, requiring only 
that such standards be 'reasonable' and 'consistent with the 
obJectives' of the Act."177 Furthermore, the Court asserts 
that the primary obJective of Title XIX is to "enable each 
State, as far as practicable, to furnish medical assistance 
to individuals whose income and resources are insufficient 
to meet the costs of necessary medical services."178 The 
claim that this is a "primary obJective" is not made by 
quoting the statute, and the statutory reference that 
appears at this point does not mention those words. 17 9 
176 42 U.S.C. *1396a(a)(1970)ed Supp. V) 42 USCA 
1396a(a)(17). 
177 Beal, 472. 
178 Beal, 472. 
179 The Court cites 42 U.S.C. 1396a(IO)(c). That section 
reads: "if medical assistance is included for any group of 
individuals who are not described in clause (A) and who do 
not meet the income and resources requirements of the 
appropriate State plan, or the supplemental security income 
program under subchapter XVI of this chapter, as the case 
may be, as determined in accordance with standards 
prescribed by the Secretary--" The statute then enumerates 
several contingencies to be applied in these situations. 
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There is no evidence offered to show that the objective of 
allowing States to furnish medical assistance is more 
fundamental than or is prior to the other obJectives of the 
Act. 
Given the Court's claim that the obJectives of Title 
XIX allow "broad state discretion," it then contends that 
Pennsylvania is only denying a desirable but unnecessary 
form of care within a category. If Pennsylvania had denied 
all care within a category, the Court concedes that there 
would be a statutory problem; yet in this instance, 
Pennsylvania is not denying a necessary operation: 
Pennsylvania's regulation comports fully 
with Title XIX's broadly stated primary 
obJective •••• Although serious statutory 
questions might be presented if a state 
Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical 
treatment from its coverage, it is hardly 
inconsistent with the obJectives of the 
Act for a State to refuse to fund 
unnecessary-:thoutHoperhaps desirable--
medical services. 
The Court argues that Pennsylvania allows for medically 
necessary abortions because, "If a physician certifies that 
an abortion is medically necessary, •• the medical expenses 
are covered under the Pennsylvania Medicaid program. If, 
however, the physician concludes that the abortion is not 
medically necessary, but indicates a willingness to perform 
the abortion at the patient's request, the expenses are not 
180 Beal, 472. 
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covered. 11181 Arguing that the Pennsylvania regulation 
leaves the entire matter to the physician's determination of 
medical necessity, the Court holds that the state plan funds 
necessary care. Since the State is not required to fund all 
treatments, and the denial of funding to the plaintiff only 
prohibited an unnecessary medical service, the Court upheld 
the legality of Pennsylvania's decision. 
The key to understanding the Beal decision is the 
Court's rhetorical moves on three issues. First, the Court 
chose to define abortion as an unnecessary medical 
procedure. If abortions were deemed necessary, then, as the 
Court concedes above, Pennsylvania would be required to 
uphold the plaintiff's request. The holding that the only 
medically necessary abortions are those that are certified 
by a physician gives strong support to the maJority view. 
Many individuals feel that all abortions are necessary, 
regardless of what a doctor may find "certifiable." The 
Court's linguistic choice here is a significant one. 
A second critical choice is the Court's determination 
that the Medicaid statute applies to procedures, treatments, 
or services, but not to conditions. Although the statute 
gives States discretion, what is it that they have 
discretion over? The majority contends that the States may 
decide which treatments to cover within a category. Had the 
Court argued that Medicaid gives discretion over conditions, 
181 Beal, 4 72. 
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then a State could agree to pay for alleviation of the 
condition of pregnancy, but it would not be able to specify 
how the condition is treated. If a State chose not to fund 
the termination of pregnancies then it would not pay for 
normal childbirths or abortions; but if states may only 
choose whether to fund a condition and not the specific 
treatments for that condition, then a decision to fund 
pregnancy terminations would require funding of all medical 
procedures for dealing with the condition. As was mentioned 
earlier, the statute does not mention procedures of any 
kind, and the decision of the Court to define Medicaid as a 
law dealing with treatments is a critical point in its 
rationale. 
The third linguistic choice of the Court is its 
definition of the objectives of Medicaid. The maJority 
decided that the primary objective of the law is to enable 
states to furnish necessary medical care, and this is an 
important link in the argument that states should be given 
broad discretion. If the Court decided, instead, that the 
objectives of Medicaid were ease of administration and the 
patient's best interests, then they would have been forced 
to consider the economic, physical, and psychological harms 
of forced pregnancy on poor women, as well as the simplest 
methods of determining eligibility for a government funded 
pregnancy termination. It is not clear that the Court could 
have sustained its position had it been forced to consider 
these effects. 
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At first glance, the Beal majority produced a 
thoughtful, well-reasoned, and articulate opinion. There 
are at least two ways to read the statute, as evidenced by 
the two lower court rulings, and the Supreme Court chose one 
of the two options. The Court opinion is clearly written, 
and the progression of ideas flows nicely. Precedent cases 
are mentioned, and the Court claims to be consistent with 
the spirit of Wade and Bolton. It is readily apparent that 
the opinion was successfully prepared for the target 
audience of Supreme Court Justices, since a maJority of them 
affirmed the decision, and the Court correctly inferred 
Congressional intent, since the Hyde amendment passed in 
Congress. 
The scope of the decision also appears to be 
reasonable; the opinion is not an explicit denial of 
governmental financing of abortions, merely a statement that 
the Supreme Court will not decide the appropriateness of 
funding. As the Court points out, "We make clear, however, 
that the federal statute leaves a State free to provide such 
coverage if it so desires."182 The Court allows state 
legislatures to determine how they will allocate their 
Medicaid funds, and it feels that these political units are 
the appropriate agencies for the decision. Further support 
is offered in the majority's claim that Congress never 
expressed an intention to fund abortions. The Court finds 
182 Beal, 474. 
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no legislative statements in Title XIX to warrant such an 
assumption, and it sees presumption working in the opposite 
direction for two reasons. First, when Congress initially 
enacted Title XIX, abortions were illegal in most states. 
Hence, it is unlikely that they intended that the states pay 
for them. Second, the agency which administers the program, 
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, "takes the 
position that Title XIX allows--but does not mandate--
funding for such abortions." 183 Therefore, the maJority 
finds no tension between the language of Title XIX and 
Pennsylvania's decision not to fund nontherapeutic 
abortions. 
Criticism of the MaJority 
Although the maJority opinion appears to be a 
reasonable response to the question before the Court, it has 
not been universally acclaimed. For example, Brennan's 
dissenting opinion does not accept the position that 
because "abortions were illegal in 1965 when Medicaid was 
enacted, •• " Congress did not intend to fund them. Brennan 
points out that "Medicaid deals with general categories of 
medical services, not with specific procedures. 
He cites a statement by the Court of Appeals: 
183 
184 
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Beal, 477. 
70 
tt184 • • • 
Congress surely intended Medicaid to pay for 
drugs not legally marketable under the FDA's 
regulations in 1965 which are subsequently 
found to be marketable. We can see no reason 
why the same analysis should not apply to the 
Supreme Court's le~islation of elective 
abortion in 1973.1 5 
Given that Congress does not mention any specific treatments 
and given examples of treatments illegal in 1965 that 
were ultimately funded under Title XIX, it is not entirely 
clear that Congress intended to exclude abortions from 
coverage. Based upon the evidence in the two opinions, 
there is no reason to believe that Congress even considered 
the issue. 
Brennan is equally unpersuaded by the position of HEW 
that payment was not mandatory. Brennan cites Townsend.!.!,_ 
Swank to say that no weight should be given to an agency 
decision when the controlling statute is inconsistent with 
that decision. 186 Thus, HEW's opinion is irrelevant. It 
does not prove the majority argument, it merely endorses it. 
The relevant question is not what HEW believes about the law 
but how the Court should interpret the statute. 
As Brennan points out, the essential issue is whether 
the maJority reads the law properly. He obviously disagrees 
185 Brennan refers to this source as "the Court of 
Appeals." The citation appearing at this point is 523 F.2d 
611, 622-623 (1975). He is presumably referring to Doe v. 
Beal. -- --
186 Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286, 30 L.Ed.2d 448, 
92 S. Ct. 502 (1971). 
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with the Opinion of the Court, but is his judgment superior 
to that of his opponents? It has been shown that a Supreme 
Court opinion should provide reasons for its decision. 
These reasons should be impartial and consistent with the 
law. Further, use of precedent cases can enhance the 
perception of the legitimacy of a decision, and precedents 
should be applied consistently and accurately. Beal rests ---
on three separate linguistic choices, and further analysis 
of these choices shotild provide a basis for testing the 
rationale of the majority. 
The maJority's first significant rhetorical move is to 
define abortions as unnecessary. If we look solely at 
treatments, then we might conclude that many abortions are 
indeed unnecessary. This is because there are alternative 
procedures, such as normal childbirth, which deal with 
pregnancy. Of course some women will still be able to argue 
that certain abortions are necessary to prevent physical or 
mental harms associated with childbirth, but the procedure 
would not merit blanket certification of necessity in all 
instances. On the surface, the rationale of the majority 
appears reasonable, yet it is only when one looks at the 
abortion procedure instead of the pregnancy that the 
treatment becomes unnecessary. If one focuses on the 
pregnancy, then a far different conclusion emerges. 
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It is not uncommon for states, under Medicaid, to pay 
for medical treatments for injuries resulting from 
accidents. Even if a patient needed a service that would 
normally be considered cosmetic and unnecessary, say a "nose 
job," that treatment would be funded if it was essential to 
the patient's health. If one says that a particular nose 
job is an unnecessary medical procedure, it would likely 
be because the condition of having an unsightly nose is 
not a condition requiring medical attention. Hence, the 
appropriateness of a treatment should be predicated upon the 
importance of the condition. A nose Job~~ is necessary 
or unnecessary, not because of the nature of the treatment, 
but because of the condition it addresses. If the analogy 
could be extended to pregnancies, then a strong argument 
against the maJority emerges. If we say that abortions are 
unnecessary medical procedures, then the most reasonable 
justification for this would be that the condition of 
pregnancy does not necessitate medical treatment. Thus, 
abortions are only unnecessary if the focus is on treatments 
and not conditions. Brennan is on solid ground when he 
claims that "Pregnancy is unquestionably a condition 
requiring medical services."187 Since childbirth and 
abortion both are procedures for termination of 
187 4 Beal, 75. 
729 (1974). 
See also Roe.!.!.. Norton, 380 F.Supp. 726, 
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pregnancy, 188 either treatment can alleviate the condition. 
Although Medicaid does not specifically mention either 
treatments or conditions, his position is that the statute 
should be interpreted to deal with conditions and not 
procedures. Medicaid should be seen to cover conditions 
because "The Medicaid statutes leave the decision as to 
choice among pregnancy procedures exclusively with the 
doctor and his patient and make no provision whatever for 
intervention by the State in that decision."189 He cites 
Section 1396(a)(19) of Title XIX which requires State plans 
to provide care in a manner maintaining "the best interests 
of the recipients."l90 Further, he quotes the Senate 
Finance Committee Report on the Medicaid bill as saying that 
the "physician is to be the key figure in determining 
utilization of health services."191 From this evidence, 
Brennan concludes that "the very heart of the congressional 
scheme is that the physician and patient should have 
complete freedom to choose those medical procedures for a 
given condition which are best suited to the needs of the 






42 u.s.c. *1396a(a)(19). 
191 Senate Report No. 404, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 46 
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192 Beal, 475. 
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In the face of Title XIX's emphasis upon 
the Joint autonomy of the physician and his 
[sic] patient in the decision of how to 
treat the condition of pregnancy, it is beyond 
comprehension how treatment for therapeutic 
abortions and live births constitutes 
"necessary medical services" under Title XIX, 
but that for elective abortions does not. 
• • • If the State must pay the costs of 
therapeutic abortions and of live birth as 
constituting medically necessary responses 
to the condition of pregnancy, it must, 
under the command of Section 1396, also pay 
the costs of elective abortions; the 
procedures in each case constitute necessary 
medical treatment for the condition of 
pregnancy." 193 
Brennan, arguing that the intent of Congress in the 
Medicaid statutes requires focus on treatments, further 
supports his contention with the claim that original Supreme 
Court abortion decisions support his interpretation of the 
law. He quotes Roe.!.!.. Wade and Doe.!.!.. Bolton where those 
decisions clearly support doctor/patient autonomy. Wade 
held that the "attending physician, in consultation with his 
[sic] patient, is free to determine, without regulation by 
the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's 
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The medical Judgment may be exercised 
in the light of all factors--physical, 
emotional, psychological, familial, and 
the woman's age--relevant to the well-
being of the patient. All these factors 
may relate to health. This allows the 
attending physician the room he [sic] 
needs to make his best medical judgment. 
And it is room that operates for the 
benefit, not the disadvantage, of the 
pregnant woman.195 
By allowing a state to allocate resources so that one 
treatment is far more attractive than another, the maJority 
allows a state to intervene in a doctor/patient decision. 
The majority's logic strays from the principles set 
down in Wade and Bolton, while Brennan is more consistent 
with the prior cases. In Wade, the Court held that there 
is no distinction between elective and non-elective 
abortions in the first two trimesters. Furthermore, if a 
state can decide that a particular abortion is not fundable 
based on the reasons for it, the decision between doctor and 
patient is no longer given the privacy protection enunciated 
in Wade. 
Footnote three of the maJority opinion addresses its 
final paragraph to Justice Brennan's argument. The 
statement acknowledges Brennan's view that the choice of 
termination procedures lies solely with the doctor and 
patient. Nonetheless, they argue, Pennsylvania's law is 
consistent with this requirement, because "its regulations 
provide for the funding of abortions upon certification of 
195 Bolton, 192. 
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medical necessity, a determination that the physician is 
authorized to make on the basis of all relevant factors."196 
In footnote nine, the opinion continues: "The decision 
whether to fund the costs of abortion thus depends solely on 
the physician's determination of medical necessity."19 7 
Brennan's refutation is quite complex. He points out 
that, while the doctor is able to determine medical 
necessity "on the basis of all relevant factors," 
Pennsylvania's definition of relevance is too narrow, 
thereby making it impossible to certify necessity in all 
cases. 1 98 Brennan points out that this strays from the 
Court's earlier position in Doe.!.!.. Bolton. The counsel's 
argument, according to Brennan, makes a woman's physical 
health the only consideration for the physician, while 
Bolton is concerned with the overall well-being of the 
woman. 199 Thus, while a physician may choose abortion, it 
is only medically necessary if the woman's health is in 
danger. Brennan believes that this distinction does not 
leave the choice of procedures solely with the physician and 
patient--the choice is only relevant when physical health is 
196 Beal, 470. 
197 Beal, 472. 
198 Beal, 476. 
199 Beal, 476. 
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jeopardized. 200 Some women may not be able to prove~ 
facto that their pregnancy will be life threatening. Others 
will not be in Jeopardy physically, but may suffer 
psychological threats to their well-being. 
The majority opinion appears to strengthen its position 
with an argument that the State has an interest in promoting 
childbirth. Roe.!.!. Wade 20l is cited as evidence for this 
point, and the Court goes on to note that Title XIX nowhere 
"suggests that it is unreasonable for a participating State 
to further this unquestionably strong and legitimate 
interest in encouraging normal childbirth."202 
The argument of the maJority is problematic. Nowhere 
in Wade does the Court mention the encouragement of 
childbirth. It lists three possible reasons for a state 
interest in regulating abortion: desire to discourage 
illicit sexual activity, concern for the prior hazards of 
the abortion procedure, and protection of prenatal life. No 
mention of the term "childbirth" is discerned. 203 
More importantly, the Wade Court is interested in the point 
at which the State interest becomes compelling enough to 
justify intervention. The Court stated that it was 
reasonable for a State to decide a point at which the 
200 Beal, 4 76. 
201 Wade, 162. 
202 Beal, 4 73. 
203 Wade, 148-150. 
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interest was compelling, and that the interest increases as 
the mother reaches full term. 204 However, in Beal, the 
Court ignores the reasoning in Wade that the state interest 
is not compelling until the third trimester. 205 They assume 
that the State interest in the third trimester is implied in 
all stages of pregnancy. This finding allows States to 
implement their moral opposition to abortion under the guise 
of a "legitimate State interest." 
It is evident that the majority's decision to define 
Medicaid as a law concerned with specific treatments and not 
conditions is weaker than Brennan's view that the statute 
leaves the decision of treatments to the patient and doctor. 
The majority's use of the word "procedure" is novel, since 
the statute does not use the word. Brennan notes the lack 
of clarity in the law, and attempts to determine the implied 
intent of Congress with the evidence which gives the choice 
of procedures to the patient and physician. The refutation 
of the maJority, Brennan's comments notwithstanding, is 
concluded with the argument that Pennsylvania leaves the 
decision solely with the physician. This is an example of a 
clear misreading of the law. The majority concedes in the 
beginning of footnote three that the decision to abort must 
rest with the physician and patient, and then concludes in 
204 
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such a way as to remove the patient from the decision. 
Furthermore, the precedent cases which Brennan cites are 
unrefuted, and Bolton clearly states that the involvement of 
the physician is always to be for the benefit of the patient 
and never for her disadvantage. 
The Court predicates its interpretation on the 
observation that Title XIX allows States to set their own 
standards that "are consistent w1.th the obJectives" of 
Title XIX, but they fail to quote the rest of the sentence 
that states what the obJectives include. It has been shown 
that the third significant rhetorical move was the Beal 
maJority's definition of Medicaid's obJectives as allowing 
States to determine eligibility and be assisted 1.n providing 
medical care. This view is incorrect. The maJority does 
not quote from the statute when it asserts that this 
obJective is "primary." Instead, the remainder of the 
sentence from the statute, which only Brennan quotes, states 
that obJectives must "be provided in a manner consistent 
with simplicity of administration and the best interests of 
the recipients. 11206 Applying these criteria to Medicaid 
gives additional support to Brennan's position. The easiest 
administrative decision over pregnancy terminations is to 
allow the patient to receive any treatment she desires. 
There would be no need for certification or review, since 
the patient's doctor would proceed with whichever treatment 
206 *1396a(a)( 19). 
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the patient and physician have decided upon. Pennsylvania's 
certification procedure is clearly less "simple" than a 
process which automatically approves any doctor/patient 
decision. Brennan also points out that the "State cannot 
contend that it protects its fiscal interests in not funding 
elective abortions when it incurs far greater expense in 
paying for the more costly medical services performed in 
carrying pregnancies to term, and, after birth, paying the 
increased welfare bill incurred to support the mother and 
child." 20 7 
Considering the patient's best interests would also 
lead to a conclusion favoring funding of abortions. Chapter 
III has described the harms of compulsory pregnancy, 
including estimates of excess mortality due to the Beal 
decision. Brennan finds support for the claim that freely 
available abortions are in the best interests of the patient 
in the Wade decision. He points out that the Wade Court 
concluded that "elective abortions by competent licensed 
physicians are now 'relatively safe' and the risks to women 
undergoing abortions by such means 'appear to be as low as or 
lower than ••• for normal childbirth.'"208 Brennan condemns 
the majority conclusions, saying that they "can only result 
as a practical matter in forcing penniless pregnant women to 
207 
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have children they would not have borne 1.f the State had not 
weighted the scales to make their choice to have abortions 
substantially more onerous."209 He believes that "the Court's 
construction makes a mockery of the congressional mandate 
that States provide 'care and services ••• in a manner 
consistent with ••• the best interests of the recipients.' 
We should respect the congressional plan by construing Sec-
tion 1396 as requiring States to pay the costs of 'necessary 
medical services' rendered in performing elective abortions, 
chosen by physicians and their women patients who 
participate in Medicaid as the appropriate treatment for 
their pregnancies."210 
The majority opinion in Beal cannot be Justified solely 
on legal grounds. The decision is based on non-legal 
factors that are not warranted by the cited precedents or 
other evidence. In this case the Court abuses the 
controlling principles in Wade and Bolton under the guise of 
adhering to them. From a legal standpoint, the most 
relevant criticism of Beal is that the opinion does not 
adequately justify the reasons for the decision. While it 
appears to be a logical progression of thought, it is, in 
reality, an unsubtle violation of precedent disguised by the 
appearance of rationality. The majority does not respond to 
the arguments of the dissent and does not justify its own 
209 
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conclusions satisfactorily. By not giving sound reasons, 
the majority opinion is highly inferior to the dissent of 
Brennan. 
It is impossible to determine the extent to which 
public pressure contributed to the Beal decision. Because 
of its flaws, one must assume that the decision is not based 
solely on a strict reading of the law and application of 
consistent legal principles. Unfortunately, the underlying 
reasons for the Beal decision may never be known. What can 
be discerned is that the maJority was willing to create 
novel definitions that allowed them to reach their 
conclusions; it is also clear that the Court's reliance upon 
these definitions makes the entire decision hinge on these 
rhetorical choices. Because of the tenuous link between the 
majority's definitions and the wording of the Medicaid 
statute, the Opinion of the Court is weaker than Brennan's 
dissent. It is impossible to predict future formulations of 
the law, but it seems that the Beal decision will either be 
overturned by a future Supreme Court or, on the contrary, 
used to justify further transformations of the law. In 
either case, the Beal decision will be memorable. And 
thousands of poor women may be forced to bear the burdens 
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